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PREFACE 
The purpose of this study is to analyze 
Supreme Court pronouncements concerning a right 
of public access to criminal proceedings in order 
to determine to what extent the Court has recog-
nized a constitutional guarantee of a public trial 
as it may apply to the accused and to the public 
and press. Because the question of public access 
to the courtroom is a relatively new one, this 
study is principally centered on recent cases which 
were decided exclusively by the Burger Court, pro-
viding a unique opportunity for a "case study." 
Consequently, a secondary thrust of the study is an 
analysis of the decision-making process of the pres-
ent Court as demonstrated by a limited number of 
cases in a limited area. 
Chapter I is devoted to a search for constitu-
tional bases for a guarantee of public access to 
the courtroom, including an examination of general 
character, historical grounding in cor.imon law and 
custom, and sources in the First Amendment, the 
Sixth Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, and the due 
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the U. S. Constitution. Chapter II considers 
and analyzes the parameters of a guarantee in terms 
iii 
of qualifications, limitations, and restrictions 
in order to determine the applicability of the 
Court's definition of a right of access. Finally, 
Chapter III evaluates the Burger Court's decision-
making in the courtroom access cases. An attempt 
is made to analyze the Court's judgments in the larg-
er context of the long-standing free press-fair trial 
debate and the relatively currentconcern for a general 
right of access to governmental activities and pro-
ceedings. 
The reader should be cautioned that this is a 
limited study of a limited area which does not attempt 
to address the many broader questions suggested herein. 
There is no attempt, for example, to address policy 
considerations or to make normative judgments. In 
short~ the study attempts to discover what the Court 
has said on one narrow constitutional question and, 
in terms of consistency, clarity and practical applic-
ability, how well it has spoken. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are certain assumptions underlying any 
democratic system of government. The most essential 
one is that government is under popular control, that 
it is responsive.to popular will and subject to popu-
lar scrutiny. The American system presupposes the 
spirit of the Declaration of Independence in that the 
purpose of government is to "ensure" rather than to 
"deprive" and that when deprivation becomes necessary, 
such deprivation be accomplished within the bounds of 
law, fairly conceived and fairly administered. 
It is an irony of such a system that dedication 
to fair treatment of individuals (as in the right to 
a fair trial) appears on occasion to conflict with 
dedication to popular control of government (as in 
the right to free speech and free press). Perhaps 
such a conflict is endemic to the system and there 
is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution 
had any solutions other than those which would be de-
vised in the on-going "practice" of self-government. 
Much attention has been paid to the adversarial 
character of certain rights and nowhere moreso than 
in the fair trial-free press debate. Only recently 
has there been much attention paid, and appropriately 
so, to the symbiotic relationship between fairness to 
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the accused and the right of the press (acting as a 
surrogate of the people) to scrutinize an institu-
tion of the government. As the courts have worked out 
techniques of courtroom management that protect the 
Sixth Amendment rights of the accused, concern has 
been focussed on not infringing on the areas of First 
Amendment rights so critical to self-government. More-
over, there is a recognition that the public has an 
interest in fair trial and the accused has an interest 
in open institutions of government. 
The issue of access has added a new dimension to 
the old fair trial-free press debate. Prior to 1979, 
the only case in which the Court had considered the 
issue of public trial directly was in 1948 in In .££, 
Oliver. But unlike Oliver, the Gannett case in 1979 
involved acquiescence of the accused so that the chal-
lenge was brought, not by the parties directly in-
volved in the case, but rather by those arguing for 
an independent right of access for the public and 
the press. Indeed, the closure of courtrooms was not 
a significant issue until trial judges began closing 
courtrooms following the 1976 Nebraska ruling in which 
the Supreme Court struck down gag orders but left open 
the question of closure as a means of protecting trials 
from potentially harmful publicity. 
Access to the courtroom has not been an isolated 
• issue but rathe~ as a part of a larger concern about 
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public access to all governmental institutions and 
activities. This concern is demonstrated in numer-
ous cases in the decade of the '?O's, some emerging 
from the Watergate incident, concerning such issues 
as access to prisons, government attempt to halt 
publication of sensitive material, reporter's privi-
lege, and general freedom of information. As a result, 
Constitutional scholars and Court observers have been 
grappling with the broader issue, within these con-
texts, of the existence and extent of a "right to know". 
It is an issue which has yet to be definitively re-
solved by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR A RIGHT OF ACCESS 
The practice of conducting criminal trials in 
public is a recognized feature of American judicial 
proceedings. It is a practice with strong antecedents 
in English common law, in the courts of colonial America, 
and in the constitutions ~f the states.1 The Sixth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "in 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
privilege of a speedy and public trial." 
The source of the practice in the American sys-
tern is traceable in English constitutional history to 
early Anglo-Saxon custom which was preserved and con-
tinued by the early Norman kings after the conquest 
of England in 1066. The Assize of Clarendon in 1166 
gave evidence of and statutory requirement for the 
English practice of attendance of freemen at trials 
as a duty.2 The Frankish contribution to the system 
took the form of introducing the practice of conducting 
inquests by jury. As royal justice spread, the Anglo-
Saxon tradition of openness was maintained as a 
1Forty-five states have specific constitutional 
guarantees of public trial. See Gannett Co. Inc. 
v. DePasquale, 99 S.Ct. 2898 (1979), Blackmun 
dissenting, note 3, p. 2923. 
2carl Stephenson and Frederick G. Marcham, ed., 
Sources of English Constitutional Histor~ (New 
York and London 1 . Harper and Brothers, 1937), 
p. 76. 
1 
procedural matter and became the hand-maiden of 
the jury system. Indeed, there is evidence that 
the early Norman kings used the public proceedings 
as a way of demonstrating and extending the power 
of the king's justice across the land. 
The practice of open trials preceded any recog-
nition of rights for the accused. The infamous Star 
Chamber was attacked not for in camera proceedings 
but for the complete lack of protection for the ac-
cused in such matters as the confronting of witnesses, 
the calling of witnesses, the use of torture to ex-
tract information or confessions, and trial by an 
independent, uncoerced jury. Rights for the accused 
were finally won during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries as common law lawyers and judges united with 
Parliament to abolish not only the Star Chamber but 
similar practices in other courts as well. During the 
entire period of struggle for the establishment of 
rights for the defendant, the practice of holding 
inquests and trials in public enjoyed an unbroken tra-
dition. Eventually, the public trial was recognized 
as a right of free citizens and as an element of a 
fair trial, inasmuch as openness protected the other 
fundamental rights from abuse. 
J"Legal Historys Origins of the Public Trial," 
Ind. L.J. 35: 251-255 (1960), P• 255. For 
additional sources on English constitutional 
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Hale, Blackstone, Bentham4 and others have dis-
cussed the tradition of public trial in terms of bene-
fit to the Crown (or to the people) and the effective 
administration of justice, rather than in terms of bene-
ficience to the accused, All have emphasized the im-
portance of open proceedings in preserving the appearance 
of available justice and insuring the integrity of the 
system. Blackstone, citing Hale, emphasized the im-
portance of publicity in his comment that ",,.the open 
examination of witnesses viva~. in the presence of 
all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up 
of truth than the private and secret examination before 
an officer or his clerk ••• 11 5 
The practice of open trials was firmly established 
in English common law at the time of the formation of 
the American colonies and, indeed, the writings of 
Hale and Blackstone were well-knovm to colonial leaders 
at the time of the American revolution and had great 
impact. It is reasonable to assume that the practice 
history, see F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional 
History of England (Cambridge: University Press, 
1961); E. Coke, J..nstitutes of the Laws of England 
103 (6th ed. 1681); I.W. Holdsworth, A History 
of English Law (1927)1 F. Pollack, The Expansion 
of the Common Law 140; also Hale, Blackstone, 
and Bentham, note 4 infra; Radin, note 5 infra. 
4M. Hale, The Histor of the Common Law of En land 
(6th ed. 1.20 1 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on 
the I,aws of England *.3721 J. Bentham, The Rationale 
of Judicial Evidence (1827) and Treatise on 
Judicial Evidence (1825). 
5commentaries, III, c. 2.3, II, p. 375, Jones' ed., 
p.1983, quoted from Radin, "The Right to a 
Public Trial," Temple L.Q. 6r 381-388 (1932), 
pp. 382-383. 
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in America was generally recognized as having the 
dual purpose of maintaining judicial integrity and 
assuring a fair trial to the populace and for the 
accused.6 There is no evidence that courts were 
closed during colonial times. Furthermore, the prac-
tice was explicitly promulgated in early colonial 
charters, documents of rights, and state constitu-
tions. For an example, the Pennsylvania Frame of 
Government (1682) specified that "all courts shall be 
open."7 
It is clear that at the time of the framing of 
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the univers-
ally common practice in the United States was one of 
open trials. The Sixth Amendment, which contains the 
only explicit mention of public trial, is framed in 
terms of the accused. In addition, other provisions 
of the Constitution, according to commentators on the 
American constitutional system and pronouncements of 
the Supreme Court, have been found to speak implicitly 
to the openness of judicial proceedings.8 Specifically, 
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, the First Amendment, and the Ninth Amend-
ment have been' considered pertinent to the analysis and 
finding of a public trial right in the U.S. Constitution. 
6"0rigins of the Public Trial," p. 256. 
?Quoted from Gannett v. DePasquale 99 S.Ct. 2898 
( 1979) , 2 92 9. 
8see text and notes supra and infra. 
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The Sixth Amendment 
Having been framed explicitly in terms of the 
accused, the wording of the Sixth Amendment has pre-
cipitated some controversy as to whether or not the 
framers intended that right to belong solely to the 
accused or whether the guarantees of the amendment 
extend beyond the interests of the accused to the in-
terests of the public as well. In Gannett v. DePasquale 
(1979), the Supreme Court, for the first time, directly 
addressed itself to the question of a public trial 
right independent of the accused. At issue in that 
case was an order by a state court which barred the 
public and press from a pret~ial suppression hearing. 
In the opinion handed down by the Court, the justices 
(with one exception9) limited their search to an analy-
sis of the Sixth Amendment. The reasoning in the 
majority opinion and the concurring and dissenting 
opinions is instructive.lo 
Justice Stewart, who wrote for the Court (in 
which only Justice Stevens joined without a separate 
opinion), took the narrow view of the Sixth Amendment, 
9powell addressed the First Amendment question, 
Gannett, p. 2914. 
lOThe decision to uphold the state court's order 
for closure was by 5-4 vote. The impact and 
meaning of the decision in regard to a right 
of access was unclear. 
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finding in it no independent constitutional right 
of the public to attend criminal proceedings. Hold-
ing that the sole purpose of the Sixth Amendment is 
protection of the accused, Stewart based his argument 
on the lack of specific Constitutional mention of a 
right of access for the public. 11 . Borrowing Blackmun•s 
dissent in Faretta v. California12 that the "specific 
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are personal to the 
accused," Stewart went on to cite case precedent13 and 
commentary in several law review articles which sup-
port that contention.14 
While noting that the public has a strong so-
cietal interest in the conduct of trials,15 and that 
the tradition of public proceedings was established 
in common law, Stewart argued a differentiation between 
11 Gannett, p. 2905. 
1295 s.ct. 2525 (1975), 2547. 
13rn re Oliver 68 s.ct. 499 (1948), note 25, P. 506; Estes v. Texas 85 s.ct. 1628 (1965), 
1653. 
14Gannett, p. 2906. In citing Radin, Stewart may 
be misrepresenting the thrust of the commentary 
which argued for limitations on public access 
rather than against a right of public access 
J2er ~·, 
15see Estes v. Texas 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1653, for 
an explication of societal interests. 
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an "interest" anq a "right," noting that not all com-
mon law rules have been elevated to the status of 
Constitutional rights.16 He further asserted that 
the interest of the public is adequately represented 
by the prosecutor, judge, and the jury, noting that a 
defendant is not permitted to waive his right to a 
jury trial without the consent of the judge and the 
prosecutor.17 
Justice Powell concurred with the finding regard-
ing the Sixth Am~ndment18 as did Justice Rehnquist, 
the latter taking the hardest line in regard to closure. 
It may be noted that as a result of Singer v. u.s.19, 
a defendant cannot compel a private trial. At issue 
in this case, according to the opinion of the Court20 
and the Rehnquist concurrence~l was whether closure is 
prohibited by the Sixth Amendment if the participants 
in the litigation agree to do so. The Rehnquist answer 
was an emphatic "no." 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, 
White, and Marshall, dissented from the principal 
16Burger agreed with this distinction, Gannett, 
P• 291.3 • 
17Gannett, pp. 2907-2908. 
1Bsee text infra for Powell's position concern-
ing other Constitutional provisions. 
1935 s.ct. 783 (1965). 
20aannett, p. 2907. 
2laannett, p. 2918. 
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findings of the majority22in regard to the Sixth 
Amendment and the question of public access to the 
courtroom. Finding a strong and unbroken tradition 
of open proceedings in the common law andex>lonial an-
tecedents as well as the original understanding of the 
Sixth Amendment, Blackmun found no basis for permitting 
closure of criminal proceedings, even with the defend-
ant's concurrence.23 He noted that in the case' of In 
!.!!. Oliver, the Court could find no instance at any 
level in the history of the U.S. in which courts had 
been closed to the public and none in England since 
the abolition of the St~r Chamber in 1641. 24 Further-
more, the Court has consistently recognized the im-
portance and beneficial effects of open and public 
trials to the system of justice.25 
Blackmun took issue with the narrow interpretation 
given to the Sixth Amendment in Stewart's opinion by 
noting that the Court has previously recognized that 
the amendment may go beyond the interests of the ac-
cused to include other interests as well. In Barker 
v. Wingo26 dealing with the right to a speedy trial, 
in Singer v. u.s. 27 dealing with the right to trial 
by jury, and in Faretta v. California28 dealing with 
22Blackmun et.al.concurred only on the question 
of mootness. 
23The defendant had concurred in this instance. 
2401iver, p. 504. See note 13 supra. 
25see Craig v. Harney 67 S.Ct. 1249 (1947)1 
Sheppard v. Maxwell 86 S.Ct. 1507 (1966); In 
re Oliver 68 s.ct. 499 (1948)1 Cox Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Cohn 95 S.Ct. 1029 {1975)1 Pennekamp 
v. Florida 66 s.ct. 1029 (1946)1 and others. 
2692 s.ct. 21s2 (1972). 
27see note 19 supra. 
28see note 12 supra. 
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the right to counsel, the Court has refused to reject 
societal interests in its considerations. Blackmun 
put particular emphasis on the Singer decision in sup-
porting his contention that the casting of a right in 
terms of the accused gives no right to the defendant 
to compel the opposite, in this case, a closed 
proceeding.29 
After reviewing the historical antecedents and 
relying heavily on StoryAs commentaries published in 
l833,30 Blackmun concluded that the public feature of 
trials was assumed by the framers and that nothing 
exists to suggest that, by framing an amendment in 
terms of the accused, the accused would have the power 
to close proceedings to the public. The societal in-
terests in the fair, efficient administration of jus-
tice are too overwhelming to have been ignored then 
or now. Societal interests in protecting against per-
jury, providing opportunity for new witnesses to come 
forward, and in deciding cases on the basis of truth 
and complete information do not always work to the 
interest of the accused. In addition, openness serves 
to provide public scrutiny of the behavior of the 
police, prosecutors, and judges, to educate the pub-
lic on the administration of the system, and to maintain 
29Gannett, pp. 2924-2925. 
30J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of 
the u.s. 662 (1833), 
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public confidence in that system, all of which are es-
sential to the exercise of self-government.31 
While giving a broad reading to the Sixth Amend-
ment, Blackmun admitted no absolute requirement for 
open trials. Recognizing limitations on public access,32 
he nonetheless rejected the notion that excluding un-
ruly spectators, for example, provides precedent for 
closing the proceedings to all. He noted that the 
majority could cite no case in which the public was 
totally excluded from proceedings.33 He also ad-itted 
the necessity of protecting the defendant's right to 
a fair trial, particularly where publicity may prejudice 
the defense. Even though exceptions may exist, the pre-
sumption of an open trial demands that grounds for 
closure must be "narrowly drawn" and that the defendant 
must establish that closure is "strictly and inescapably 
necessary.".34 In no instance is the burden on the pub-
lic to provide justification for maintaining an open 
proceeding.35 
Despite the longstanding perception that conflict 
exists between the rights of the press and rights 
31Gannett, PP• 2930-Jl. 
32see Chapter 2 for a more extensive discussion 
of limitations. 
33aannett, note 11, p. 2931. 
34Gannett, P• 2936. 
35see Chapter,2 for a discussion of closure 
standards. 
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regarding fair trial, traditionally cast as a First 
versus Sixth Amendment conflict, Blackmun was not 
convinced that the interests of the public and rights 
of a defendant are incompatible. To the contrary, 
publicity threats to fair trial are not always so 
unmanageable, as seen in Nebraska Press Association 
v. Stuart36 and Murphy v. Florida37, as to prevent 
fair trial. In those cases where the Court has reversed 
convictions because of publicity, that publicity was 
abnormally high.38 Indeed, the harm anticipated is 
largely speculative.39 
The Blackmun opinion concluded that the public 
right of access to criminal proceedings in the Sixth 
Amendment includes the press as well. Both Sheppard 
v. Maxwe1140 and Nebraska v. Stuart41 support the right 
of the press to report events occurring in the court-
room. Reporters "are entitled to the same rights as 
the general public" in regard to access.42 
3696 s.ct. 2791 (1976), See text and notes supra. 
3795 s.ct. 2031 (1975). The case was marked by 
a high degree of publicity. 
3gSuch as Irvin v. Dowd 81 S.Ct. 1639 (1961); Rideau 
v. Louisiana 83 S.Ct. 1417 (1963); Sheppard v. 
Maxwell 86 S.Ct. 1507 (1966); Estes v. Texas 
85 s.ct. 1628 (1965). 
39Gannett, p. 2938. 
40sheppard, p. 1522. See text and notes supra, 
particularly Chapter II. 
41 Nebraska, p. 2807. 
42Estes, p. 1631 quoted in Gannett, p. 2939. 
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In regard to the Sixth Amendment, the Gannett 
case presented the question of whether or not the 
public has a right, independent of the parties direct-
ly involved in a case, to attend criminal proceedings.43 
That the public has an interest in judicial proceed-
ings is generally recognized. Whether that interest 
constitutes a right in the Sixth Amendment is disputed. 
Burger, Stewart, Stevens, Rehnquist, and Powell would 
appear to find no such right; Brennan, White, Blackmun, 
and Marshall did. But the right of public access to 
the courtroom was not settled even by a 5-4 decision 
on the issue. The plethora of opinions created dif-
ficulties on a number of questions. One was the failure 
of the opinion to make a clear distinction between pre-
trial and trial procedures. Another was the fact that 
only Justice Powell was willing to look beyond the 
Sixth Amendment for a constitutional basis for a right 
to attend trials on the part of the public and press. 
43There is federal court authority supporting 
both positions. Geise v. U.S. (1959, CA 9 
Alaska) 265 F 2d 659 and Tribune Review Pub-
lishing Co. v. Thomas (1957, DC Pa) 153 F 
Supp 486, affd (CA 3 Pa) 254 F 2d 883 support 
the Sixth Amendment inuring solely to the ac-
cused. That the right to public trial in the 
Sixth Amendment belongs also to the public in 
general, see U.S. v. Cianfrani (1978, CA 3 Pa) 
573 F 2d 835, U.S. v. Kobli (1949, CA 3 Pa) 
172 F 2d 919, U.S. ~· rel. Mayberry v. Yeager 
(1971, DC NJ) 321 F Supp 199, and U.S. v. Lopez 
(1971, ED NY) 328 F Supp 1077, 14 ALR Fed 252. 
12 
The First Amendment 
The result of the Gannett decision was wide-
spread confusion as to the nature and extent of the 
ruling. More than 300 motions to close criminal court 
proceedings followed, more than 200 of which were 
granted.44 Such was the confusion that four justices 
made public comments in an effort to clarify the de-
cision, particularly as to its applicability to 
trials.45 Despite their efforts, the Court eventually 
granted certiorari to review the closure of a trial 
in Virginia on appeal by Richmond Newspapers, Inc. and 
in this instance addressed the question of public ac-
cess to the courtroom in the First Amendment.46 
While the Gannett decision did not reach a First 
Amendment right of access, some reference was made to 
it. The language of the Stewart opinion is interest-
ing in this regard for the Justice seemed to indicate 
that if such a right did exist, the trial court had 
given appropriate deference to it by its actions in 
44Bill Winter, "Richmond Case Widens Access, Spawns 
Debate," ABAJ 661 946-947 (August 1980). 
4
.5n.G. Stephenson, Jr., "Fair Trial - Free Press1 
Rights.in Continuing Conflict," Brooklyn L.R. 46: 
39-66 (Fall 1979), 
46Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 100 S.Ct. 
2814 (1980). The First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution says that "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of reliqion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press, or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances." 
13 
ordering closure. Specifically, he said "several 
factors lead to the conclusion that the actions of 
the trial judge here were consistent with any right 
of access (my emphasis) the petitioner may have under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendment~" Stewart empha-
sized that the trial judge had conducted a proceeding 
to hear objections to the motion for closure, had 
balanced the rights of the press and public against 
the rights of the defendant, and had concluded that 
a "reasonable probability for prejudice" existed. Sig-
nificantly, he explicitly interpreted the balancing 
as being' one of competing societal interests rather 
than being grounded in any First Amendment freedoms.47 
There is no indication that Stewart (and Stevens or 
Burger, by implication) rejected a First Amendment 
basis. Neither did they choose to reach it in the 
Gannett case. 
As noted above, Powell went straight to the First 
Amendment issue in the Gannett case (he did not par-
ticipate in the Richmond Newspapers case). Without 
extensive rationale, he based his finding of a right 
of public access on the public's need to have accurate 
information about the operation of the system and the 
f idiciary role of the press in providing that informa-
tion to the public. Recognizing limitations on that 
right, and the responsibility of the trial court to 
47Gannett, p. 2912. 
14 
guard the right to a fair trial for the defendant, 
he was concerned that a constitutional standard be 
provided for trial judges in making judgments and 
moved to the task of defining the parameters of such 
a standard in light of due process imperatives.48 
In both the Gannett and Richmond cases~9 Justice 
Rehnquist flatly denied a First Amendment guarantee. 
Contending that the Court has refused to recognize 
such a right in the past, he cited Nixon v. Warner 
Communications~O Pell v. Procunier~l Branzburg v. 
Hayes~2 Zemel v. Rusk~3 Estes v. Texas, and Houchins 
v. KQEn.54 But Rehnquist was the exception, for of 
the eight justices participating in the Richmond de-
cision, seven found a right of public access to the 
courtroom in the First Amendment. 
The judgment of the Court in the Richmond case 
was announced by Chief Justice Warren Burger but no 
one joined his opinion. Instead the other justices 
48Gannett, PP• 2914-2915. 
49Gannett, p. 2918 and Richmond, p. 2843. 
509g s.ct. 1306 ( 1978). 
5194 s.ct. 2800 (1974). 
5292 s.ct. 2646 ( 1972). 
5335 s.ct. 1271 ( 1965). 
5498 s.ct. 2588 ( 1978). 
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participated in the three concurring opinions filed 
in the case. As in the Gannett case, the Court did 
not speak with one voice except in the finding of a 
First Amendment right. 
Citing historical evidence of a tradition of open 
trials and the strong presumption of openness inhering 
in the American system of justice, Burger concluded 
that the societal interests in keeping trials open 
were basic to the American system of a government con-
trolled by the people, and that the press played an 
essential role in informing the public~5 He demon-
strated no concern, as he did in the Gannett case, 
with the lack of explicit Constitutional mention of 
the right in terms of the public but was content that 
the Bill of Rights were adopted on a "backdrop" of 
a long history of open trials and concluded that the 
right to attend "gives meaning'' to the explicit guaran-
tees of the First Amendment56 
In this vein, he noted that "free speech carries 
with it some freedom to listen" citing several cases 
which support a broad reading of the First Amendment 
to allow a full range of activities in support of First 
Amendment rights to free speech, press, and assembly. 
For example, he quoted language from Kliendienst v. 
55Richmond, p. 2825. 
56Richmond, p. 2827. 
16 
Mande157("right to receive information"), and from 
Branzburg v. Hayes58 ("right to gather information"), 
and concluded that such rights would have no meaning 
without a corollary "right to access''. The rights to 
speech and press would be empty without a right to in-
formation~9 The trial judge erred in not giving full 
consideration to these rights in making a judgment re-
garding closure~O (The judge was acting in part on a 
Virginia statute which allowed closure at the discre-
tion of the trial judge.) 
The Stevens concurrence 61 is noteworthy for its 
discussion of two past cases which would seem to deny 
right of access or a "right to know".62 In Saxbe v. 
Washington Post, the Court had allowed restrictions 
on the press so long as such restrictions did not 
single out the press in a discriminatory way. Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Powell took strong exception to 
the conclusion. In Houchins v. KQED, Justices Brennan 
and Powell were joined by Justice Stevens in objecting 
5792 s.ct. 2 5 7 6 ( 1 97 2 ) ' 2581. 
5892 s.ct. 2646, 2656. 
59Richmond, p. 2°82?. 
60Richmond, P• 2829. 
6lRichmond, pp. 2830-Jl. 
62see Rehnquist dissent in Gannett. 
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to similar restrictions permitted by the Court•s 
opinion on the flow of information. Stevens con-
cluded that had Blackmun and Marshall participated 
in the Houchins decision the Court•s conclusions 
would have been quite different. He further noted 
the irony in the Court's willingness to recognize 
a right of access of the press to the courtroom 
in the instant case while the Court was willing 
to deny a right of access to prison facilities 
(Houchins), particularly given his perception that 
the general public has a more powerful ability to 
voice objections than do prisoners. 
In the first part of the Richmond opinion in 
which they concur in the judgment, Justices Brennan 
and Marshall also deal with the Saxbe and Houchins 
cases, as well as Pell v. Procunier, Zemel v. Rusk, 
and Estes v. Texas, in which the Court seems to have 
refused to recognize an enforceable right of ac-
cess to information about government operations. 
They caution a careful reading of those cases and 
confine the rulings to a recognition by the Court 
that such access is ~subject to a degree of restraint 
dictated by the nature of the information and coun-
tervailing interests in security or confidentiality," 
concluding that these cases can be cited as neither 
upholding or denying a right of public access to 
18 
information. Employing the terms "freedom of expres-
sion" and implying terms such as "freedom of communi-
cation" and "right to gather information", these 
Justices promulgate the theory that the First Amendment 
has a greater role than mere protection, to wit, it 
also has the "structural role" of fostering and pro-
moting a meaningful exercise of what it protects.63 
This theory was not. newly proposed here but was 
expressed by Brennan in an address printed in the 
Rutgers Law Review in 1979, There Brennan proposed 
two models dealing with the rights of the press. 
One was the "speech model" which he defined as de-
serving absolutist protection. The other, the 
"structural model", includes an umbrella of all 
press functions, such as newsgathering and news 
disseminating, which had to be weighed against 
other societal interests. Responding to protests 
by the press to the Gannett decision, Brennan as-
serted that neither model fit the particular situa-
tion in that case since the concerns were for the 
rights of the public as well as the press and because 
Gannett was cqnfined to ruling on the Sixth rather 
than the First Amendment.64 Since the Court finally 
63Richmond, pp. 2832-2833. 
64Brennan, "Address," Rutgers L.R. 32, 173-186 
(1979), PP• 181-182. 
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reached the First Amendment question in the Richmond 
case, he could employ the "structural model" and, in 
fact, does so in providing an analytical structure 
for his opinion. 
Use of the structural model means that Brennan 
was basing his findings not just on history and tra-
dition, but also on the values served in maintaining 
popular control of the activities and institutions of 
government. Trials, being a genuine governmental 
proceeding, must be accessible in order to provide a 
check on trial procedures and in order to enhance the 
factfinding function of the courts through publicity.65 
The availability of transcripts at the end of the trial 
is "no substitute for" the actual presence of people 
at tria1. 66 
Due Process - The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
The Fifth Amendment (U.S. Constitution) guaran-
tees that "~o person shall ••• be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law •••• " 
The Fourteenth Amendment (U.S. Constitution) states 
" ••• nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property,. without due process of law •••• " 
The due proce~s clauses as applied to criminal pro-
cedures have been held, over the long course of the 
65Richmond, p. 2838. 
66Richmond, P• 28J9. 
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Court's history, to mean that procedures must be 
fair. Fair procedures were those provided specifi-
cally in Amendments Four, Five, Six, and Seven (U. s. 
Constitution). 
In its early history, the Court held to a doc-
trine that certain guarantees were applicable only to 
the national government. It did so even after it 
demonstrated willingness to apply First Amendment 
guarantees to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.67 
This allowed the Court to reform federal procedures 
without movin~ into state procedures, which it began 
to do as early as 1914 with Weeks v. U.S.~ The process 
was accomplished in a case-by-case, incremental man-
ner with much importance being given to the safeguards 
listed in the Bill of Rights and the onus being placed 
on federal judges to guard the purity and fairness of 
procedures which were deemed essential to liberty and 
fairness.69 
In the matter of state procedures, the Court in-
tervened only against the most blatant of state prac-
tices. Despite a sensitivity to procedural rights, 
67see Gitlow v. N.Y. 278 U.S. 652 (1925), 
68232 u.s. J83 (1914). 
69M. Shapiro and D. Hobbs, The Politics of 
Constitutional Law with revisions (Cambridge, 
Mass., Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1974), pp. 
300-301. 
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the Court showed a reluctance to soften judicial 
self-restraint and interfere with the states. In-
stead, the Court began to apply (by the early 4o's) 
a fair trial rule in which it refused to strike down 
state proceedings based on a violation of a specific 
Bill of Rights provision, but rather preferred to 
decide "on the basis of the totality of the circum-
stances whether the trial as a whole had been 'fair'."70 
The rule, in practice, proved to be vague and 
was gradually eroded in a number of incremental de-
cisions in which the Court incorporated various 
provisions of the Bill of Rights into the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.71 This slow pro-
cess culminated in Mapp v. Ohio in which the Court, 
for the first time, made a criminal procedure ele-
ment of the Bill of Rights directly applicable to 
the States?2 The case was followed by others, such 
as Gideon v. Wainwright?3 Escobedo v. Illinois,74 
70shapiro, p. 240. 
71shapiro, p. 241. 
72367 U.S. 643 (1961), specifically the search 
and seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment. 
73372 U.S. 335 (1963), the right to counsel in 
the Sixth Amendment. 
74378 U.S •. 478 (1964), the right to counsel and 
the right against self-incrimination in the 
Sixth and Fifth Amendments respectively. 
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Miranda v. Arizona75, and Duncan v. Louisiana76, 
in which the Court clearly established a uniform, 
national policy of procedural standards on the 
states and localities.77 
In the matter of a public trial, the key case 
in which the Court held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment may hold a basis for a right was In ~ Oliver 
(1948). Repeated reference was made to it in the 
opinions profferred in the current public trial cases 
discussed above. In Oliver, the Court specifically 
ruled that failure to provide a public trial was a 
violation of due process of law. Justice Black cited 
the heritage of English common law and what he refer-
red to as "the universal rule against secret trials." 
He also noted that the open trial was "an accompani-
ment of the ancient institution of jury trial ... 78 
Without specifically discussing them, Justice Black 
made reference to other benefits which public trials 
may "confer upon our society." 
75384 U.S. 436 (1966), the right to be advised 
of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by police. 
76391 u.s,. 146 .(1968), the right to a jury trial 
in the Sixth Amendment. 
77shapiro, p. 305.· For addition~! discussion of 
the incorporation of the fair trial amendments, 
see H. Abraham, Freedom and the Court (New Yorks 
Oxford University Press, 1977), PP• 71-8). 
78oliver, p. 503. 
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The Court has applied the due process guaran-
tee in the Fourteenth Amendment in other cases as 
well. For example, it did so in Mayberry v. Pennsyl-
vania79 and in Baker v. Utecht.BO Subsequently, in 
all of the recent cases dealing with a right to a pub-
lic trial in state proceedings, whether based on First 
or Sixth Amendment grounds, the Fourteenth Amendment 
has been incorporated. Seldom, however, has there been 
direct reference in these cases to specific due pro-
cess grounds. Due process considerations do come into 
play where various justices attempt to establish pro-
cedures for limiting attendance at trials or for ac-
tual closure. These will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
In the case of Levine v. u.s.,81 the Court 
ruled that the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment requires a public proceedine. Likewise, in a 
more recent case in federal court, U.S. v. Cianfrani,82 
a presumption of openness was held essential to due 
process. The Third Circuit court also upheld the 
right of access in the Sixth Amendment, finding an 
independent public right in order to promote societal 
interests. 
7991 s.ct. 499 (1971), 
B06s s.ct. 204 (1947). 
B1so s.ct. 1605 (1960). 
82 (1978, CA3 Pa) 573 F2d 835. 
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The Ninth Amendment 
The Ninth Amendment (U.S. Constitution) states 
that "the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people." In the Richmond opin-
ion, Chief Justice Burger.used the Ninth Amendment to 
refute the argument that no right to attend public 
trials is protected by the U.S. Constitution because 
there is no specific mention of such a right. Noting 
that the Founding Fathers included this amendment in 
order "to allay fears" about the possible exclusion 
of rights not enumerated, 83and that the Court has 
previously acknowledged some rights as being implicit, 
Burger held that the right to attend public trials 
was implicit in the First Amendment.84 
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in the Richmond 
case, flatly and without exception, rejected the use 
of the Ninth Amendment as pertinent to the case. No 
other justice made use of Ninth Amendment grounds for 
determining the case, although the substance of the 
Ninth Amendment was implicit in their constitutional 
interpretations of the First Amendment. 
The Ninth Amendment has been largely disregarded 
by scholars and Supreme Court Justices. Authored by 
83Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, #84, 
84Richmond, p. 2829. 
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James Madison, it grew out of his apprehension that 
the enumeration of rights in the Bill of Rights might 
be construed as a denial of other unenumerated rights. 
The amendment assumes that unenumerated rights exist 
which require protection and supports the principle 
of limited government inherent in the letter and 
spirit of the Constitution. If the inclusion of the 
amendment were to be tak~n seriously in constitutional 
analysis, it would not be outside the purview of a body 
engaged in judicial review to search for those rights. 
The Supreme Court has recognized the existence 
of penumbras to the Bill of Rights, that is, that 
certain rights emanate from the enumerated rights 
which give those guarantees life and substance. The 
notion that unenumerated rights are those which en-
hance the exercise of free and open government would 
certainly support a claim that a right of access to 
criminal trials supports and fulfills a constitutional 
scheme of informed discussion protected by the First 
Amendment. That is precisely the argument made by the 
concurring Justices in the Richmond case, without re-
course to the N,inth Amendment. 
The very open-ended character of rights provided 
by the Ninth Amendment may very well be the reason for 
the reluctance to employ it. Justice Hugo Black es-
sentially ignored the provision and he was noted for 
26 
judicial activism and interpretivism. It is, perhaps, 
no wonder that others, with Black, would find the 
jurisprudential implications of the provision cause 
for discomfort. A too enthusiastic embracing of the 
amendment may not serve principled judicial enforce-
ment but might instead so enhance the Court's _function 
of judicial review as to seriously overwhelm the po-
litical branches of government in a manner inconsistent 
with a commitment to representative democracy. Cer-
tainly those who advocate judicial restraint-might 
think so and continue to ignore the Ninth Amendment. 85 
85see Charles W. Dennis, Jr., "A First and 
Ninth Amendment Theory of a Right of Access 
to Criminal Trials," West New England L.R. 21 
723-758 (Spring 1980) and John H. Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge and London: 
Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. J4-41. 
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II. QUALIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON A RIGHT OF ACCESS 
Given that the consensus of the Supreme Court 
(all but Rehnquist) is that some right of public 
access to judicial proceedings exists, difficulties 
arise when one is faced with the task of defining the 
parameters of such a right. If the Court's finding 
of a right seems strained and circuitous in terms of 
constitutional sources, it is even more so in terms 
of temporal questions of applicability to the totality 
of the judicial process, in terms of functional limita-
tions on access, and in terms of standards of limita-
tion on access and how they are to be imposed. 
As mentioned above, the Court in Gannett v. 
DePasquale~ failed to make a clear statement as to 
the applicability of the ruling on trials asopposed 
to pre-trial proceedings. The result of that fail-
ure was widespread confusion as to the scope of the 
ruling as it applied to full trials. At issue in 
the Gannett case was closure of a pre-trial hearing; 
the substance of the decision, by 5-4 vote, was no 
finding of a Sixth Amendment right of access to pre-
trial proceedings. But the decision of the Court was 
199 s.ct. 2898 (1979). 
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not definitive. Justice Stewart often used the 
terms "trial" and "pre-trial" interchangeably in 
his opinion for the Court, making unclear the ap-
plicability of his judgment to trial proceedings. 
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger alone in his concur-
ring opinion addressed the temporal question.2 
Noting that the Sixth Amendment specifically speaks 
to "trial", Burger drew a distinction between a 
pre-trial proceeding, such as a suppression hear-
ing, and the actual trial itself and concluded that 
the presumptions are different for each. Pre-trial 
activities have traditionally been private and not 
considered part of the trial unless and until the 
results are actually offered as evidence.J 
Whatever the reasons for the lack of clarity by 
the Court in the matter of temporal applicability, 
the resultant confusion moved four Justices to 
speak publicly on the matter.4 Burger recapitulated 
his view that the opinion in Gannett applied to pre-
trial proceedings only. Blackmun, although opposed 
to the decision, was convinced that the ruling would 
allow closure of full trials as well as pre-trial pro-
ceedings. Powell and Stevens, respectively, expressed 
2Gannett, PP• 2913-2914. 
3Gann~tt, P• 2914 
4Bill Winter, p. 947. 
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misgivings about the failure of the Court to ad-
dress First Amendment grounds and the need for 
new court rules or perhaps legislation to deal 
with trial closure,5 Nonetheless, perplexity 
reigned as witnessed by various news accounts and 
commentaries6 and by the number of motions for 
closure in the lower courts.? 
Seven days following the Gannett ruling, the 
Virginia Supreme Court upheld closure of a trial in 
Virginia and on October 9, 1979, the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear arguments 
in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. Many com-
mentators guessed that the Court would focus again 
on the Sixth Amendment and provide some clarif ica-
tion as to its applicability to full trial proceed-
ings in terms of a right of access,8 Instead, in 
its opinion handed down on July 2, 1980, the Court 
went directly to the conclusion that the First and 
5o,G. Stephenson, p. 64. 
6see Goodale, .. Gannett Means What It.Says, But 
Who Knows What It Says? .. Nat'l L.J. (October 
15, 1979), and Stephenson, "Rights in Continuing 
Conflict •• ~." . 
?winter, p. 947, 
Bsee Steph~n M. Kelley, "Members of the Public 
and Press Have No Sixth Amendment Wight to At-
tend Pre-Trial Criminal Proceedings," U11Detroit 
J, Urb. L. 57: 547-87 (Spring 1980), P• 579, 
and Jonathan Howden, "Freedom of Expression and 
the Media, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale," Hastings 
.Const. L.Q. 71 338-352 (Winter 1980), p. 351. 
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Fourteenth Amendments guaranteed a right of access of 
press and public to crimin~l trials.9 Justice White, 
in a brief concurring opinion, noted that the case and 
indeed the First Amendment question would have been 
unnecessary had the Court followed the lead of the 
four Gannett dissenters in finding a Sixth Amendment 
presumptive prohibition against closure. 10 He did not 
admit that the Court might reasonably have addressed 
the First Amendment question in its Gannett ruling. 
The other Justices failed to comment on the matter 
except for Blackmun who complimented the Court on its 
reliance on legal history in making its determination. 
He also expressed his gratification in seeing "the 
Court wash away at least some of the grafitti that 
marred the prevailing opinions in Gannett." He re-
proved Burger (who wrote the opinion in the Richmond 
case) for making the distinction between pre-trial 
proceedings and the trial itself in his Gannett con-
currence and yet joining the Court's judgment and 
thereby contributing to the resultant confusion.11 
9rn his concurring opinion (Richmond,· p. 2840), 
Justice Stewart specifically extended the guar-
antee to' include civil trials as well. There 
was a suggestion in the Gannett case that civil 
proceedings were included. Both Justice Blackmun 
and Justice Rehnquist cite two cases involving 
civil actions,· Nixon v. Warner Communications 98 
s.ct. 1306 (1978) and Pell v. Produnier 98 s.ct. 
2800 (1975). See Kelley, P• 554. 
10Gannett, P• 2830. 
11Gannett, P• 2841. 
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Blackmun reiterated his position that the Gannett 
decision was erroneous in its interpretation of the 
Sixth Amendment and in its application to pre-trial 
suppression hearings,12 
Otherwise, the Court failed to address the ques-
tion of access to pre-trial proceedings based upon 
First Amendment grounds. That question remains open, 
presumably awaiting another case in which such argu-
ment might be made. 
The distinction between pre-trial proceedings 
and full trials has been discussed by commentators 
and by the Court itself in dicta. The Gannett case 
was, in many ways, a "logical outgrowth"l3 of Nebraska 
Press Association v. Stuart. 14 In that case, the 
Supreme Court struck down a gag order15 restraining 
publication by the press of information received in 
a pre-trial hearing. The gag order was deemed to be 
12Gannett, p. 2842. 
lJKelley, P• 555. 
1496 s.ct. 2791 (1976). 
15The use of "gag orders" by state and federal 
courts grew out of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Sheppard v. Maxwell 86 S.Ct. 1507 
(1966), The Court's ruling was widely inter-
preted by lower courts as supporting issuance 
of such orders against the press, a construc-
tion which many commentators questioned. See 
J.C. Landau, "Fair Trial and Free Press1 A 
Due Process Proposal," ABAJ 621 55-64 (January 
1976). 
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prior restraint against which there exists a high 
presumption of unconstitutionality16 which imposes 
a heavy burden not overcome by the circumstances. 
Chief Justice Burger noted that while "it can be 
said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions 
after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 
'freezes' it at least for the time: 17 
Though it prohibited restraint placed on the 
press to publish information already in its posses-
sion, the Court in Nebraska did not address the 
question of whether or not the trial judge could 
prevent the press and the public from receiving in-
formation by issuing exclusionary or closure orders. 
In fact, in a footnote, Burger alluded to existing 
guidelines18 that recommended closing of pre-trial 
proceedings, but he expressly refused to confront 
that issue.19 By implication, several commentators 
have noted, courts were left free to inhibit news 
l6Nebraska, p. 2808. For case precedent sup-
porting a presumption against prior restraint, 
see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson 51 s. Ct. 
625 (1931); Organization for a B~tter Austin 
v. Keefe 91 s. Ct. 1575 (1971); and New York 
Times Co. v~ u.s. 91 s.ct. 2140 (1971). 
17Nebraska, p. 280). 
18American Bar Assoc. Project on Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Fair Trial and Free Press 
2-15 (App. Draft 1968). 
19Nebtaska, p. 2805. 
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gathering at its source.20 Thus, after Nebraska 
the main point of emphasis in the free press/fair 
trial controversy moved from prior restraints to 
exclusionary orders with commentators expressing 
differing views as to the constitutionality of 
those orders.21 Courts began to resort to restrict-
ing access to pre-trial hearings and sealing docu-
ments and records of such hearings from the public.22 
What is the material difference between pre-
trial and trial proceedings that has led to such 
confusion in the Court's stand? In Gannett, Burger 
asserted that the stuff of modern pre-trial proceed-
ings--such as the exclusionary rule and pre-trial 
motions to suppress evidence--were unheard of at the 
20see M.J. Zavatsky, "Rights in Collision: 
Deciding Cases in the Free Press/Fair Trial 
Debate," U. Cinn. L.R. 49: 440-61 (1980); 
Landau, "Free Press Boon ••• "1 "Free Press -
Fair Trial Dilemmaz New Dimensions in a 
Continuing Struggle," Hofstra L.R. 6:1013-40 
(Summer 1978). 
21see "The Wight to Attend Criminal Hearings," 
Columbia L.R. 78:1308-1321 (1978); "Clos~re 
Orders: Safeguard of Fair Trial or Prior 
Restraint?", Fordham Urban J.L. 7:163-90 
(1978-79)s "New Dimensions ••• ," Hofstra. 
22Paul Britton, "The Right to Attend Pre-trial 
Criminal Proceedings: Free Press, Public Trial 
and Priorities in Curbing Pre-Trial Publicity," 
Syracuse L.R. 28(4): 875-921. 
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time of the framing of the Constitution.23 Stewart 
said that no right of the public to attend pre-trial 
hearings existed in English common law, that the pur-
pose of pre-trial hearings was to prevent contaminated 
information from reaching the jury and thus infring-
ing on fair trial. Suppression hearings, although 
unknown in early times, rationally served the same 
purpose.24 
There is a great deal of commentative litera-
ture?5 however, to refute this viewpoint and Justice 
Blackmun's partial dissent joins that view.26 Indeed, 
an opinion out of the Third Circuit in 197327 upheld 
the view that pre-trial suppression hearings fall 
within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a public 
tria1.28 According to this argument, pre-trial hear-
ings are so similar to trials and so often determinative 
23Gannett, p. 2913. 
24Gannett, footnote, p. 2910. 
25see "Right to Attend ••• " Columbia, as an example. 
26Gannett, P• 3933. 
27u.s. v. Cianfrani, 573 F 2d 835, 849-51 (1978 
CA 3 Pa). Al~o note U.S. v. Lopez 328 F. Supp. 
1077, 1987 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)1 "This right to a 
public trial attaches at the suppression hear-
ing - often the crucial stage." 
28one judge rejected Sixth Amendment grounds in 
favor of First Amendment grounds. 
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of the outcome of litigation, 29that any constitu-
tional right of access would be applicable. Blackmun 
thought this particularly true of suppression hear-
ings. He wrote that, "unlike any other proceeding 
apart from the trial itself, the suppression hearing 
implicates all the polieies that require that the trial 
be public."30 He went on to argue that pre-trial hear-
ings, and suppression hearings in particular, are so 
important to the system of justice as to be considered 
''part of the trial."31 In fact, the suppression hear-
ing may be the only proceeding held and may be the point 
in the total procedure where misconduct by police and 
other parties may be most in evidence. In addition, 
the most relevant evidence might be suppressed without 
public scrutiny if the procedure is closed.32 He went 
on to deny that the interest of the public is protected 
by the prosecutor, judge, or other parties, given the 
possibility of connivance among them. Closure of these 
proceedings would undermine the confidence of the pub-
lic and the appearance of justice.33 Therefore, the 
29It is in pre-trial hearings that decisions are 
made in regard to incarceration pending trialor 
the setting of bond for bail. Also, plea bargain-
ing arrangements are made in this phase which can 
result in the dropping of charges or the incar-
ceration of defendants on arranged guilty pleas. 
30Gannett, p. 2934. 
31Gannett, P• 2935. 
32Gannett, pl 2934. 
J3Gannett, p. 2935. 
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same values which would require public trials 
would extend to pre-trial suppression hearings 
as well, according to this argument. 
Those who would argue for closure of pre-trial 
suppression hearings follow the reasoning offered 
by Justice Stewart in Gannett when he posed the 
problem of publicity at this stage as being "par-
ticularly acute." While prejudicial information 
can, by various means, be.kept from jurors at full 
trial, it may be impossible to shield jurors from 
such information that has been publicized via a 
pre-trial hearing. Thus, Justice Stewart argues, 
fair trial may be jeopardized and closure is often 
"one of the most effective methods that a trial 
judge can employ ••• " 34 
But Blackmun gave significant weight to the 
importance of suppression hearings as distinguish-
able from other pre-trial proceedings, such as pre-
liminary hearings, to determine probable cause for 
binding a defendant for trial, grand jury procedures, 
coroner's inquests, and others. These, he contended, 
are not critical to the system and thus the Court's 
reliance on statutory law and precedent and legal his-
tory dealing with these latter procedures do not serve 
to support private suppression hearings with which 
34aannett, p. 2910. See also Burger's concurrence 
in Gannett, p. 2914. 
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they do not deal. He further contended that where 
there is no pre-trial suppression hearing (and there 
is no federal regulation that states conduct such 
hearings), objections to evidence are made after pre-
sentation in "open court" and thus the temporal fac-
tor should not be used as a standard for justifying 
closure on grounds of protecting jurors from inadmis-
sable or contaminated evidence.35 
But Blackmun, as well as the other members of 
the Court, recognized that there are few absolutes in 
the matter of seemingly conflicting rights, and all 
recognize the importance of insuring to the defendant 
a fair trial. Despite the strong presumption in favor 
of open proceedings (whether found in the First or 
the Sixth Amendment and whether applicable at pre-
trial or trial stages), courts have recognized ex-
ceptions, limitations, and restrictions even when the 
accused has objected to such exclusions. 
For example, the Supreme Court and other federal 
courts have held that a requirement of public trial 
does not include all of the public or even all seg-
ments of the public. In Sheppard v. Maxwel1,J6 the 
court allowed restrictions on newsgathering techniques, 
35Gannett, p. 2935. 
36see note 15 supra~ 
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In Estes v. Texasi7 the Court restricted the use of 
electronic media.JS Again, in Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc.~9 the Court held that there is 
no requirement that tapes admitted into evidence be 
released to the general public. There is, therefore, 
no recognizable right for unlimited public access to 
all that occurs at a trial.40 
In addition, as noted in the Gannett opinion, ex-
clusion has been upheld to avoid embarrassment to wit-
nesses, to protect spectators from obscene or offensive 
testimony and to maintain order and decorum.41 Courts 
have also allowed exclusion to avoid prejudice to the 
J7s5 s.ct. 1628 (1965). , 
38on January 26, 1981, in Chandler v. Florida 
(49 LW 4142), the Supreme Court refused to 
declare unconstitutional a Florida court rule 
permitting the presence of broadcast media (radio 
and TV) in the courtroom absent a definitive 
showing by the defendant of a specific due pro-
cess violation. In so doing, the Court rejected 
a contention that its Estes ruling had estab-
lished a per ~ constitutional rule barring 
broadcast coverage of courtroom activities. 
The narrow ruling was that the Court would not 
interfere with Florida practices "absent a 
showing of prejudice oi constitutional dimen-
sions." (p. 4147). 
39see note 9 supra. 
40see U.S. v. Rios Ruiz (1979, CA1Puerto Rico) 
579 F 2d 670r U.S. ex rel. Orlando v. Fay 
(1965, CA2 NY) 350 P-2d 967, cert den 384 US 
1008, 16 L Ed 2d 1021, 86 s.ct. 19611 U.S. v. 
Juarez (1978, CA5 Tex) 573 F 2d 267, reh den 
(CA5 Tex) 577 F 2d 1134 and cert den 439 US 
915, 58 L Ed 2d 262, 99 s.ct. 289. 
41Gannett, p. 2910. 
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state~2 to prevent overcrowding~3 to preserve con-
fidentiali ty~4 to prevent the intimidation of wit-
nesses~5 and to protect national security concerns.46 
In both the Gannett and Richmond decisions, various 
justices gave recognition to reasonable restrictions 
and limitations imposed by trial judges for the con-
venience of the court and the protection of certain 
considerations not necessarily of a constitutional 
nature,47 There is no dicta in either Gannett or 
Richmond to indicate a change in limitations of this 
nature on public access to the courtroom. 
Given that neither a recognizable Sixth Amendment 
guarantee nor a recognizable First Amendment guaran-
tee of a public trial is absoiute to either the defend-
ant on the one hand or to the press and public on the 
other, what constitutes grounds in the eyes of the 
Supreme Court for closure to insure a fair trial? And 
given the establishment of identifiable grounus, what 
procedures must a trial judge follow in order to close 
proceedings to the public? 
42u.s. ex rel. Laws v. Yeager (1971, CA3 NJ) 448 
F 2d ~,-cert den 405 U.S. 976, 31 L Ed 2d 251, 
92 s.ct. 1201.· 
43u.s. v. ~obli (1949, CA3 Pa) 172 F 2d 917. 
44u.s. v. Bell (1972, CA 2 NY) 464 F 2d 667, cert 
den 409 u.s. 991, 34 L Ed 2d 258, 93 s.ct. 335. 
45Perez v. Metz (1977, SD NY) 459 F Supp 1131. 
46u.s. v. Nixon 94 s.ct. 3090. 
47Richmond, p. 2840. 
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There is no dispute that the trial judge is 
responsible for the conduct of the trial and for 
the protection of the interests of the defendant 
and public alike in the fair administration of jus-
tice within the framework of Constitutional guaran-
tees.48 In carrying out this responsibility, the 
trial judge must not only rely on interpretations 
of Court rulings on the broad questions but must 
also look to the Court and case precedent for guid-
ance in applying those rulings in specific cases. 
In Gannett, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice 
Stevens, would allow closure on the consent of the 
prosecutor and defendant. There is no indication 
that a~y consideration of circumstances or mitigat-
ing factors is necessary. Rehnquist, who took the 
hardest line, specifically stated that the partici-
pants may cause closure "for any reason" whatsoever, 
for the Justice is absolutist in finding no right of 
access for the press and public.49 Chief Justice 
Burger, alone, in restricting application to pre-
trial situations, offered no tests or standards for 
closure beyond the defendant's request.50 
48see Shepherd and Nebraska. 
49Gannett, P• 2918, 
5°aannett, pp. 2913-14. 
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The dissenting group (Blackmun, White, Brennan 
and Marshall), which found a right of access in the 
Sixth Amendment, was naturally more circumspect and 
placed the burden of proof on the defendant to 
establish that closure is "strictly and inescapably 
necessary" for a fair tria1.51 Deigning to lay down 
an absolute standard, Blackmun suggested a minimum 
showing by the defendant of {1) concrete and specific 
evidence of "substantial probability of irreparable 
damage," ( 2) evidence of "substantial probability" 
that measures other than closure are inadequate for 
protection of fair trial rights, and (J) evidence of 
positive, "substantial probability" that closure will 
work.52 Blackmun went on to caution that high levels 
of publicity do not necessarily or automatically work 
to the detriment of a defendant's rights to a fair 
trial. In fact, he refers to the Nebraska decision 
in noting that instances of reversals on those grounds 
are "relatively rare" and that the harm feared is usu-
ally highly speculative.53 If the defendant is able 
to show the above and the trial judge orders exclusion, 
such exclusion orders should extend only to the nar-
rowest limits necessary and should be temporary. Ac-
curate records for future scrutiny are essential. As 
51Gannett, p. 2936. 
52Gannett, p. 2937. 
53Gannett, p. 29J8, Nebraska, p. 2800. 
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to the due process rights of those subject to ex-
clusion, Blackmun would not require an evidentiary 
hearing, nor would he require that the public be 
given advance notice of the exclusion. He would, 
rather, give those directly subject to exclusion 
opportunity to voice objections in court prior to 
the order taking effect and would require the court 
to place its reasons for closure in the trial record. 
The press would enjoy no special due process rights 
apart from the public at large.54 Blackmun indicated 
that he would not erect a standard here as strict as 
he might advocate in the instance of a First Amendment 
question, rejecting the assertion that closure is com-
parable to prior restraint. In fact, as noted in 
Chapter 1, he specifically refused to address the is-
sue of access on First Amendment grounds in this case.55 
Justice Powell in addressing First Amendment con-
siderations in his Gannett opinion did not see the 
necessity of as strict a standard as would be required 
in a prior restraint situation such as Nebraska. He 
even found the Blackmun standard too inflexible even 
to permit exclusion-where necessary for fair tria1.56 
54Gannett, P• 2939. 
55Gannett, p. 2940. 
56Gannett, P• 2915. 
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Rather, he would advocate a balancing of First and 
Fifth Amendment considerations in which no rights 
were subordinated to others. While rejecting the 
stricter standard, Powellfound some relevance to 
this case in the Nebraska situation where the Court 
proposes that the trial judge must consider alter-
native means of protection, hear objections of those 
actually present and subject to exclusion, and place 
the burden on the defendant (and on the State if it 
joins in the request for closure) to show the neces-
sity for it. The public and the press have responsi-
bility for putting forth viable alternative means 
which would serve to mitigate any harm to fair tria1.57 
In the instant case, Powell found that the trial judge 
had acted appropriately and thus he concurred in the 
judgment. 
The alternative to closure alluded to in various 
opinions, though not discussed in detail, are those 
enumerated at length in both Sheppard v. Maxwell and 
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart. They include 
voir dire, jury sequestration, jury instruction, 
continuance, severance, change of venire, change of 
venue, sealing of the transcript, and control of 
courtroom atmosphere and decorum. The adequacy of 
these measures to insure a fair trial in the presence 
57Gannett, p. 2916. 
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of press and public attention is uncertain in the 
minds of some of the justices, particularly those 
five in the Gannett majority who would allow unre-
stricted closure by agreement of trial participants. 
Their decision in the Richmond case would indicate 
greater faith in those measures. 
But in the Richmond case, the circumstances dif-
fer. Here the Court by 7-1 ruling (Powell did not 
participate), found a definitive right of access to 
full trials in the First Amendment. Great lip serv-
ice is given to the importance of First Amendment 
rights and their structural role in the American sys-
tem of government in general and the administration 
of justice in particular. By implication, the opinion 
of the Court and the concurring opinions filed recog-
nized that such rights were not absolute and one 
might expect some delineation of a standard of excep-
tion. But as Blackmun pointed out in his concurrence, 
such was not the case. 
Chief Justice Burger found fault with the trial 
judge's closure decision in that it failed to provide 
reasons for closure and made no inquiry as to alterna-
tive measures available short of closure. Burger used 
the term "overriding interest" to describe circum-
stances which might warrant closure,58 He did not 
58Richmond, p. 2829-30. 
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define his meaning. Justice Stevens also could find 
no record of justification, implying that such a 
record might present acceptable reasons for closure. 
Again, there was no definition of what might be 
justifiable.59 
Justice White would, apparently, allow exclusion 
under "narrowly defined citcumstances."60 Justices 
Brennan and Marshall mention "countervailing interests" 
which might tip the balance away from a First Amend-
ment presumption of openness, but did not in this case 
define those interests and how they might be protected. 
These Justices were troubled that the state had pro-
vided the judge with "unfettered discretion'' in order-
ing closure,61 Justice Stewart spoke of "reasonable 
limitations upon the unrestricted occupation of a 
courtroom" and alluded to alternatives available in 
trial situations.62 
59Richmond, beginning at p. 28JO. Following the 
Gannett decision, one commentator (Goodale, 
note 6 supra) speculated that Stevens might 
ultimately favor a Blackmun standard if the 
Court ever recognized a right of public access 
to full trials. His reasoning was based on 
the fact that Stevens had ~oted for access in 
previous cases. Indeed, Stevens referred to 
those cases in his Richmond concurrence but 
failed to endorse any particular standard. 
60Richmond, p. 28JO, 
61Richmond, p. 2839. 
62Richmond, p. 2840. 
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Blackmun, who had suggested a fairly strict 
test in his Gannett dissent, found the standards 
suggested in both these cases to be "troublesome" 
and marked by "uncertainty" as to their nature and 
strictness. He agreed with his colleagues that the 
trial judge in this case had abridged the public's 
First Amendment interests but obviously had some 
concern for trial judges in future cases faced with 
the task of balancing competing rights and interests.63 
6JRichmond, p. 2842. 
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III. CONVERGENCE OF PRECEDENT IN 
ANALYZING A RIGHT OF ACCESS 
An analysis of the rulings of the Supreme 
Court in the Gannett and Richmond decisions and 
their legal impact in regard to a right of access 
of the public to judicial proceedings necessitates 
an examination of the precedential bases of those 
decisions. On the surface, these cases would appear 
to attach to the long line of cases dealing with what 
has been commonly referred to as the "fair trial-
free press controversy", Ho~ever, of equal import-
ance are those cases in which the Court has dealt 
with the question of access to governmental infer-
mation and institutions. Indeed, there is a convergence 
of these two lines of precedent employing several threads 
of constitutional thought.1 
Fair Trial - Free Press Precedent 
The fair trial - free press controversy represents 
a confrontation of two compelling constitutional guar-
antees represented by the First and Sixth Amendments. 
Few clashes of interest have been more resistant to 
1Robert F. Copple, "Public Trials and a First 
Amendment Right of Access: A Presumption of 
Openness," Nebraska L.R. 60: 169-199 (1981). 
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solution since both seem to occupy preferred posi-
tions in the Constitution,2 The controversy is 
generally centered around the effects of publicity 
on a defendant's right to a fair trial. Such pub-
licity may adhere prior to trial thus prejudicing 
the jury pool or it may involve publicity and the 
methods of newsgathering during trial which may 
prejudice the ability of the defendant to secure 
a fair trial. When adversarial conflicts have arisen 
between these two compelling interests of free and 
open discussion of public issues on the one hand and 
justice in the courtroom on the other, the Supreme 
Court has had to balance the two and, in doing so, 
attempt to define a state of law capable of resolving 
such conflicts. 
The controversy has a long and involved history. 
Early cases centered on the use of the contempt power 
to control the activities of the news media vis-a~vis 
the criminal justice system. Over the years, the 
Court gradually refined the doctrine of contempt by 
publication until, by mid-century, a trial court's 
power to use contempt against the press had been so 
contracted as to be useful only in controlling disorder 
2u.s. v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U.S. 144 
(1938). 
in the courtroom and in areas immediately adjacent 
thereto.J 
The next line of defense in the Court's arsenal 
against prejudicial publicity was the tack of revers-
ing convictions on due process grounds.4 Reversals 
were based on the statement of Justice Jackson in 
the Shepherd case that "newspapers in the enjoyment 
of their constitutional rights, may not deprive ac-
cused persons of their right to a fair trial. The 
convictions ••• do not meet any civilized conception 
of due process of law. That alone is sufficient •.• 
to warrant rev~rsal. 11 5 Two notorious cases, Estes v. 
Texas6 and Sheppard v. Maxwell?, involved reversals 
of highly celebrated criminal convictions, the latter 
exemplifying the worst and most flagrant documented 
3principal 20th century cases dealing with the 
contempt power are Toledo Newspaper co. v. U.S. 
247 U.S. 402 (1917); Bridges v. California 314 
U.S. 252 {1941); Times Mirror Co. v. Superior 
Court 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida 
328 U.S. 331 (1946); Craig v. Harney 331 U.S. 
367 (1947); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show 
333 u.s. 912 (1950). 
4see Shepherd v. Florida 343 U.S. 181 (1951); 
Marshall v. U.S. J60 U.S. 310 (1959); Irwin v. 
Dowd 366 U.S. 717 (1961); and Rideau v. 
Louisiana 373 U.S. 723 (1963). 
5Alfred Friendly and Ronald L. Goldfarb, Crime 
and Publicity (New York1 The Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1967), P• JOO. 
685 s.ct. 1628 (1965). 
786 s.ct. 1507, 384 u.s. 333 (1966). 
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abuse on the part of the judiciary, the press, and 
law enforcement of the fair administration of jus-
tice. The Sheppard case represents the most definitive 
statement by the Supreme Court in regard to press in-
terference with due process. 
In Sheppard, the Court attempted to provide guid-
ance to trial court judges (who were finding themselves 
subject to reversal if they improperly balanced First 
and Sixth Amendment interests) in determining how to 
protect fair trial rights in the face of prejudicial 
publicity. In its decision, as previously noted,8 
the Court listed those procedural safeguards available 
to the trial court while noting that "reversals are 
but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial 
measures that will prevent the prejudice at its in-
ception."9 The Court's suggestions reaffirmed the 
trial judge's power to control the courtroom and 
provided precedent for affirmative judicial actions 
to protect the integrity of fair trial.lo Signifi-
cantly, the Court went beyond in-court measures and 
recommended that the trial judge control the release 
8see Chapter II. 
9sheppard, 384 u.s., 363. 
10sheldon Portman, "The Defense of Fair Trial 
from Sheppard to Nebraska Press Assoc: Benign 
Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond," 
Stanford L.R. 29(3): 393-410 (February 1977), 
P• 405. 
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of information to the press by witnesses, counsel, 
and police, specifically recommending prohibitions 
against "extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, 
party, witness, or court official which divulged 
prejudical matters ..... 11 
The impact of the Sheppard decision was to re-
vive the use of the comtempt power to control the 
effect of prejudicial publicity. Following the deci-
sion, there was a proliferation of silence or gag 
orders. 12 But in addition to issuing gag orders 
against parties, lawyers and witnesses, courts be-
gan issuing gag orders directly against the press 
itself. That such direct orders were mandated by 
the Sheppard decision is highly questionable but 
such orders were being used, citing Sheppard as 
precedent. 
The issuance of a direct gag order against the 
press was the issue in the Nebraska case,13 the next 
major case in the modern interface of First and Sixth 
Amendment rights and the first head-on confrontation 
between the two, In holding the order invalid as an 
unconstitutional use of "prior restraint," the Court 
11sheppard, 384 U.S., 361. 
12The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 
Washington, D.C., cited some 173 cases by 1975. 
Censorship Newsletter VIII (October - November 
197 5). 
1396 s.ct. 2791 (1976). 
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leaned away from concerns about due process and an in-
creasingly powerful press toward a concern for First 
Amendment values. In this case, the Court employed 
a traditional balancing doctrine, rejecting absolute 
rules against prior restraints. 
While the decision to overturn was unanimous, 
there was disagreement among the Justices as to jus-
tification and as to grounds. An analysis of this 
opinion and some speculation on the Court's decision-
making process are instructive. 
The Court's opinion, authored by Chief Justice 
Burger, refused to place an absolute ban on prior 
restraints in judicial contexts. Justice Brennan, 
as evidenced by his concurring opinion in which 
Justices Marshall and Stewart joined, wanted just 
such an absolute ban on all gag orders. Justices 
White and Stevens joined with Burger but, in their 
separate concurring opinions, both indicated that 
they were leaning toward the Brennan position by ex-
pressing doubts that an instance justifying prior 
restraint orders would ever exist. (There is evi-
dence that there was a behind-the-scenes confrontation 
over the assignment of the opinion and that the 
Brennan concurrence was originally written as the 
opinion of the Court. 14) Despite its reluctance to 
14 See Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The 
Brethren (New York: Simon and Schuster:--I°979). 
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completely ban such orders, the Court did place an 
extremely high barrier against them, requiring the 
strictest scrutiny and presumption of invalidness. 
Some commentators, nonetheless, have expressed 
discomfiture at the Court's refusal to establish an 
absolute ban and its continued use of a case-by-case 
balancing technique. The door was left open, accord-
ing to some, for a future restriction on newsgathering 
activities.15 The Court would appear to be restating 
its rejection of the Black-Douglas absolutist posi-
tion that the First Amendment means what it says 
without exception, a position which has enjoyed no 
support on this Court. 16 Despite this, the Court has 
upheld First Amendment absolutes in such cases as 
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn17 and in Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.18 An absolute ban on press 
15see, e.g., M.J. Zavatsky, "Rights in Collisions 
Deciding Cases in the Free Press/Fair Trial 
Debate," U.Cinn. L.R. 49:440-461 (1980); 
Robert D. Sack, "Principle and Nebraska Press 
Association v. Stuart," Stanford L.R. 29(3)s 
411-430 (February 1977), 
16sack, p. 413 citing A. Bickel, The Morality of 
Consent (1975) and H. Black, A Constitutional 
Faith 45 (1968). 
17420 u.s: 469 (1975), (absolute ban against 
restrictions on publishing information from 
public court records). 
18418 U.S. 241 (1974), (absolute right for pub-
lishers to choose to refrain from publishing 
political replies). 
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gag orders would have provided predictability and 
security; failure to do so may result in trial 
judges attempting to employ them, resulting in costly 
and time consuming appellate procedures.19 
However, it is difficult to see how such orders 
could pass the test established by the Nebraska opin-
ion given Chief Justice Burger's stringent standards 
for allowing them. Standards prerequisite to an 
order would require that ·(1) pre-trial publicity is 
likely to reach the jurors, (2) alternative measures 
would not succeed and (3) a gag order would succeed 
in mitigating adverse publicity. In all likelihood, 
these requirements would be impossible to meet and 
the Court may, given the dicta in the concurring 
opinions, one day establish a per se ban on prior 
restraints in all but national security ~ases,20 
The recognition of a categorical right of the 
press to report what occurs in open court left open 
the question of whether a court could simply close 
proceedings and, thus, limit access to the information. 
19sack, p. 414. See also James c. Goodale, "The 
Press Ungagge.ds The Practical Effect on Gag 
Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Assoc. v. 
Stuart,~ Stanford L.R. 29(3)s 497-513 
(Febnrlary 1977). 
20while placing severe limitations on direct 
prior restraint orders against the press, the 
Court has left intact the use of silence or-
ders against trial participants as sources of 
information. 
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The only significant case, prior to 1979, in which 
the Court had dealt with a secret judicial proceed-
ing was In ~ Oliver21 in which the defendant had 
charged a violation of his due process righti. The 
Court had never had to rule on closed judicial proceed-
ings in which the defendant had acquiesced in the 
closure and in which the judge had issued a direct 
order for closure. The Nebraska decision precipitated 
the issue by leaving the door open for trial judges 
to employ such a technique in attempting to insure 
fair trial in the face of active media interest. 
Right of Access Precedent 
The existence of a right of access has been dis-
cussed by the Court in several theoretical contexts 
prior to the Gannett and Richmond cases. Most basic-
ally, the Court has consistently recognized that the 
First Amendment protects a right of expression.22 
Concomitantly, it has recognized a right to receive 
information available to it and to transmit a message.23 
2168 s.ct. 499 (1948). 
22see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 276 U.S. 
354, (1964) 283, that the "general proposition 
that freedom of expression upon public ques-
tions is secured by the First Amendment has 
long been settled by our decisions." 
23see, e.g., Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council 425 u.s. 748 (1976); 
Stanley v. Georgia 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Fed. Communications 
Comm. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
The cases at issue would add another context to the 
mix with an assertion of an affirmative right to 
gather information. 
The most significant line of access precedent 
affecting Gannett and R1ichmond began in 1965 with 
Zemel v. Rusk in which the Court rejected a First 
Amendment argument and held that "the right to speak 
and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained 
right to gather information. 11 24 This idea was expanded 
in Branzburg v. Hayes when the Court refused a re-
porter's claim to protection of confidential sources 
by advancing the principle that the press and public 
are equal in that "the First Amendment does not guaran-
tee the press a constitutional right of special access 
to information not available to the public generally. 11 25 
But, the Court also said, somewhat contradictorily, 
that "newsgathering is not without its First Amendment 
protections ...... 26 While the Branzburg case was spe-
cifically directed to the issue of reporter's privilege 
rather than to the question of a public right of access 
to the institutions and processes of government, it 
clearly added to the debate over the existence of such 
24381 U.S. 1 (1965), 16. 
25408 U.S. 665 (1972), 684. 
26Branzburg, P• 707. 
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a right.27 
In two related cases, Pell v. Procunier28 and 
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.?9 the issue of a First 
Amendment right of access emerged again. Both dealt 
specifically with access to prisoners and prison fa-
cilities and in both holdings the Court denied special 
press access, reasoning that restrictions placed on 
the press did not inhibit the press f~om scrutinizing 
public institutions. The Court re-emphasized its 
Branzburg statement that the press was entitled to no 
special privilege not available to the public at large, 
but in Pell the Court again noted that newsgathering 
had First Amendment protections.JO 
Then, in a case factually similar to the above, 
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.~ 1 the Court was faced with a 
claim that a First Amendment right of access had been 
abridged. In denying the claim, the Court appeared 
to be following its Pell and Saxbe holdings, but the 
decision was far from clear. Only three Justices 
27 Copple, p. 180. 
28417 u.s. 817 (1974). 
29417 U.S. R43 (1974). 
3°copple, p. 181-182. 
31438 u.s. 1 (1978) 
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found no First Amendment right to Government-controlled 
information or sources (Burger, White and Rehnquist). 
Stewart concurred on the narrow ground of the Pell and 
Saxbe refusal to give the press special privileges 
over the public, though he noted that practical dis-
tinctions might exist.32 The dissenters--Stevens, 
Powell and Brennan--noted that Pell and Sax.be had 
dealt with facilities where some access was already 
allowed, whereas Houchins presented an unfounded, ar-
bitrary policy of concealment. Since Blackmun and 
Marshall did not participate, the significance of the 
Court's decision is problematic and the Court's posi-
tion on a definitive right of access was unclear. 
Analysis 
As noted above, the Gannett case offerred the 
Court the opportunity to address the question of ac-
cess in a fair trial - free press context. In its 
decision, the Court refused to recognize a right of 
access to judicial proceedings in the Sixth Amendment, 
reserving the First Amendment question for the Richmond 
case in which the Court recognized a First Amendment 
right of access to criminal trials. A close scrutiny 
of that decision, in light of the precedential bases 
noted above, reveals that the Richmond case does not 
fit perfectly or neatly into either line of precedent. 
The closure of a court proceeding was neither specifically 
32Houchins, p. 16. 
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prescribed by Sheppard nor specifically proscribed 
by Nebraska. Like Nebraska, the Richmond decision 
did rest on a First Amendment issue and prior re-
straints and court closures are somewhat analogous. 
Certainly the effects are the same since both are 
~·parte orders preventing or postponing publica-
tion.33 The press has argued that they are equiva-
lent in that a closure order is indirect prior 
restraint and ought to be· outlawed on the same ba-
sis. But there are fundamental differences between 
the two which such an argument misses. For one, gag 
orders are direct interference with the exercise of 
free expression and are prohibited because they di-
rectly prevent the publicatiori of :information already 
obtained. Closure orders prevent publication by pre-
venting access. The difference here is more to method 
than to effect, but the scope is also different in 
that a prior restraint is variable and broader whereas 
closure is limited to a specific proceeding and a 
specific source. In addition, the press, under a gag 
order, could choose to violate the order and proceed 
to release information to the public. No such option 
exists where proceedings are closed plus the general 
public has no opportunity to scrutinize. The Nebraska 
case, therefore, recognized a press right to transmit 
33copple, p. 187. 
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information but not to gather it. The Richmond 
case was clearly not an extension of Nebraska but 
was instead a case breaking new ground.34 
Therefore, the Court correctly characterized the 
case as one of access but was immediately confronted 
with its Gannett holding. Gannett had been cited by 
the Virginia Supreme Court in its upholding of clos-
ure; therefore, in order to recognize a right of 
access, the Court either ·had to overrule Gannett or 
restrict its applicability. It chose the latter 
course, allowing the Sixth Amendment analysis of no 
general right of access to stand and restricting the 
Gannett holding to pre-trial proceedings. 
The Court then had to confront its previous treat-
ment of a right of access in the First Amendment, par-
ticularly its refusal in Houchins to recognize a per 
se right of access to sources of information under 
government control. Court proceedings certainly fell 
within that framework. Clearly, from the dicta, the 
Court wanted to open trials to the public but was 
apparently reluctant to lift all restrictions on ac-
cess across the board. It either had to overrule the 
entire package of access cases or find a way to limit 
a right of access specifically to opening trials and 
to do so in a way that was congruent with previous 
rulings. 
34see generally, "New Dimensions in a Continuing 
Struggle," Sack, pp. 427-428; Copple, pp. 187-188. 
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The Court chose the latter option although how 
well it did so is problematic. One commentator sees 
no incongruence between the access cases and the 
Richmond issue, noting that in the previous cases 
the Court had not only never denied a right of access 
but also had never directly addressed the issue.35 
Both Burger and Brennan, in their divergent approaches 
to finding a source, sought to reconcile the finding 
of a right of access with the previous cases. Justice 
Stevens, as noted supra and infra, found such efforts 
troublesome and largely unsuccessful. 
Neither Burger nor Brennan received support from 
a majority of the Court for their two distinct thee-
ries in support of a right of access to the courtroom. 
Again, the Burger Court had handed down a decision 
in which the reasoning was cloudy and the impact 
uncertain. 
The Chief Justice found support in an analysis 
of Anglo-American history, in the speech and press 
clauses and the right of assembly clause of the First 
Amendment, and in the Ninth Amendment. His histori-
cal analysis was a general statement of policy. His 
constitutional analysis rested on the First Amendment 
which he interprets as establishing a penumbra right 
of access based on the functional role played by 
35craig H. Lubben, "Right of Access to Criminal 
Trials," Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 
711 547-557 (Winter 1980), p. 553. 
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the speech, press and assembly clauses in the process 
of self-government. He extended the First Amendment 
protections for speakers and writers to include the 
right to listen by those receiving information. 
Burger attempted to reconcile Richmond with Pell, 
Saxbe and Houchins (and in so doing justified the 
limitations he placed on the reach of his judgment) 
by distinguishing the previous cases as dealing with 
institutions not characterized by a tradition of 
openness as contrasted to courts which are so charac-
terized. This points to at least one difficulty with 
any employment of an historical analysis, for such an 
analysis does not allow for historical deviation from 
constitutional norms or ideals. 
Burger encountered other difficulties. One com-
mentator has scored the opinion as being technically 
flawed in that the cases cited to support his conten-
. tion of a right of access based on the speech, press 
and assembly clauses were misinterpreted,36 The 
Chief Justice, in attempting to narrow his holding to 
criminal trials, also encountered some analytical dif-
ficulties and produc~d some inconsistent reasoning. 
He centered his' analysis on the "therapeutic" value 
to society of scrutinizing the operation of the crimin-
al justice system and on the "cathartic" value of the 
criminal trial in serving a function to society. He 
J6 Lubben, P• 554. 
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thus announced the discovery of a new penumbral 
First Amendment right to protect these values. 
Therefore, he appeared to be promoting a theory 
that access is protected by the First Amendment 
where a tradition of openness exists because such 
openness promotes efficiency of governmental opera-
tion. Indeed, the Chief Justice offered: an interest-
ing twist to First Amendment theory, one which sees 
the First Amendment as intending to promote good, 
efficient government rather than promoting the per-
sonal liberties of the people.37 
Burger's Ninth Amendment analysis also suffers. 
The premise is a valid one, the Ninth Amendment hav-
ing received a dearth of attention in the analysis 
of rights, but he failed to develop it logically. 
The point is that the Court has acknowledged that 
certain rights are implicit in enumerated rights 
and are, in fact, peripherally necessary to the full 
enjoyment and security of these specific rights.JS 
The problem is that, while he insisted that a right 
to attend criminal trials enhances the freedom of 
press and speech, he failed to show why making a 
transcript available would not serve the same purpose, 
J?"The Supreme Court, 1979 term: Freedom of 
Speech, Press, and Association," Harvard L.R. 
941 149-159 (November 1980). 
38see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticutt 381 U.S. 
479 (1965). 
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given his acknowledgement that people do not gen-
erally attend trials but rely on newspaper accounts 
for information.39 (Brennan could have incorporated 
the Ninth Amendment into his structural model more 
successfully.) 
Justice Brennan's opinion differed from that of 
the Chief Justice on several significant points. In 
the first place, Brennan denied the discovery of a new 
constitutional right, as·serting that the right al-
ways existed, but that the Court had simply never 
had opportunity to address it affirmatively. The 
problem here results from divergent approaches in 
dealing with the precedential right of access cases. 
Brennan interpreted them as holding out some restric-
tions on a right of access; Burger remembered his own 
flat denial of such a right in Houchins, forgetting 
that he was not supported by a majority of the Court.4° 
Whoever is right, the Court is likely to be plagued 
in the future by these earlier cases. 
Another major point of divergence is the source 
of a right of access. Instead of finding it in a 
conglomeration of F~rst Amendment protections of the 
rights of discussion, Brennan found an independent 
basis in the structural role played by the First 
Amendment. This model links the rights of communication 
39 ~ Lubben, p. 55~. 
40s St ' ' . th R' h d ee evens opinion in e ic mon case, 
PP• 2830-2831. 
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to the process of self-government, thus extending 
protection to whatever promotes full debate and 
discussion of governmental operations. Government 
is required, therefore, to open the courtroom to the 
scrutiny of the public. In line with his interpre-
tation of the access precedents, Brennan was reluctant 
to make a right of access either unrestricted or un-
conditional and proposed a two-tiered test to deter-
mine where a right of access exists. The first tier 
was based on the historical question of whether or 
not a tradition of openness for a particular govern-
mental institution or process exists, to which he 
added the question of whether or not access was im-
portant to its function. In the matter of criminal 
trials, both tiers of the test were met. 
On the surface, given the weight which each gives 
to tradition plus the grounding in the First Amendment, 
it would appear that Burger and Brennan have simply 
arrived at the same point from two different philo-
sophical directions. In actuality, the differences 
are substantial. In the first place, Brennan's First 
Amendment theory is more in line with the purposes of 
the First Amendment since the l&.mendment was designed 
not to protect the spectacle of what government does 
so much as it was designed to foster a citizenry af-
firmatively equipped for self-government. (One com-
mentator has suggested that Brennan's structural model 
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has given new life to First Amendment doctrine and 
may help to revitalize such confused doctrines as 
that of "public forum" and will have implications 
beyond the courtroom issue.41) Burger•s judgment 
was more restrictive and, as far as the broader im-
plications are concerned, would appear to allow that 
those institutions which have been traditionally 
open can remain so whereas those which have been 
closed may possibly remain closed. Justice Brennan's 
model would allow a broader definition of a right of 
access which may reach to areas not previously sub-
ject to an assertion of a right of access. 
In regard to the courtroom, it is clear that 
both believe that access must be contemporaneous. 
Delayed review of recordings or transcriptions were 
considered inadequate to serve and promote the purpose 
of public evaluation and control over the judicial sys-
tem. Cold records do not faithfully reproduce the 
subtleties of bias or dishonesty. Also, the -quality 
of discussion is highest when interest is highest and 
interest is highest with contemporaneous access. 
Having clearly,established constitutional bases 
for a right of access to the courtroom and having 
agreed that the right was not absolute, the Richmond 
decision falls short at the point of clearly establish-
ing the parameters of application. As previously 
41 "1979 term," pp. 154-155. 
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noted, Brennan was particularly disturbed by the un-
certainty of the standards for closure. The Court 
instructed the trial judge to tread softly, to provide 
justification for any closure order, and then failed 
to provide clear guidance for doing so. The trial 
judge knows only that the standard is less stringent 
than the Nebraska prior restraint test even though 
the practical effect of both gag and closure orders 
is the same. Out of this inconsistency, the trial 
judge is left to weigh the effects of any order, 
I 
balance competing interests in favor of the "overriding" 
ones, and risk being the subject of the next case in 
which the Court may be willing to provide more defin-
ite standards and requirements. 
In addition, the Court will ultimately have to 
address the application of its First Amendment analy-
sis to pre-trial suppression hearings and perhaps to 
other pre-trial proceedings as well. A trial judge 
will certainly have to weigh the Richmond judgment 
against the Gannett judgment before closing such a 
proceeding. He or she might conclude that some just-
ification may be required without having any basis for 
judging how much. A case in which the Richmond analy-
sis is applied to suppression hearings may represent 
a more precise convergence of the fair trial - free 
press and right of access issues than existed in the 
Richmond case. 
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CONCLUSION 
It has been said that the case history of 
the fair trial - free press issue has been long 
and tortuous. The interjection of the question 
of public access has not' mitigated that condition. 
Beginning with Nebraska on one side and Pell and 
Saxbe on the other, the Burger Court shows signs 
of being badly splintered and unable not only to 
form a consensus but also to articulate one. These 
decisions are marked by pluralitiesr for example, 
the Nebraska decision had five opinions, the Gannett 
decision had five opinions, and the Richmond decision 
had seven separate opinions! 
Archibald Cox has theorizedl that this Court 
is marked and marred by an unwillingness on the part 
of individual Justices to yield their personal pre-
ferences and by a desire by some to influence the 
future by providing separat·e analyses. The result 
·. 
is fragmentation and fractionalization which produces 
1Archibald Cox, "Freedom of Expression in the 
Burger Court," Harvard L.R. 92: 1-73 
(November 1980). 
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decisions which are lacking in clarity, consistency, 
and even practicality. This condition may be attribut-
able to real differences so sharp as to be irreconcil-
able or it may be that several of the Justices are 
afflicted with philosophical rigidity and injudicious 
concern for personal prerogatives. Cox has suggested 
that the law clerk system in which clerks change an-
nually has contributed to a lack of unity in philoso-
phy and authorship.2 Woodward and Armstrong gave 
evidence of that in The Brethren, but the law clerk 
system is not peculiar to the Burger Court. What 
may be singularly characteristic of this Court is a 
tendency of some Justices to require law clerks to 
write in support of some preformed opinion. Given 
the semi-secret nature of Supreme Court deliberations, 
such observations are partially speculative but are 
not without support in any reading of the decisions 
and the noting of extra-judicial statements by the 
Justices themselves. 
The Burger Court (and particularly the Chief 
Justice) shows a reluctance to deviate from a cautious, 
aase-by-case approach to issues. In addition, there 
is evidence of a desire to employ some judicial re-
straint in confining decisions to the narrow issues. 
The paradox is that while doing so in relation to the 
2 Cox, p. 72. 
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judgments, the myriad opinion writing is character-
ized by a broad-swept engagement of multiple questions 
which result in opinions marked by ambiguity and more 
unanswered questions. As aoonsequence, the decisions 
are incoherent, fail to square with previous rulings 
in some instances, and fail to maintain "an evergrow-
ing yet continuous body of law."} If the pattern 
continues, not only is the Burger Court likely to suf-
fer from diminished influence but the rule of law 
will suffer as well. 
In summary, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has recognized an independent right of aceess for the 
public and press to trials in the First Amendment. 
It has denied the existence of such a right of access 
to pre-trial proceedings in the Sixth Amendment but 
has yet to address the question of access to pre-trial 
proceedings in the First Amendment. If and when it 
does so, it must consider the various kinds of pre-
trial proceedings and differentiate them in congruence 
with its reasoning in the Richmond case. 
The right of access to the courtroom is not con-
sidered absolute. C~osure of courtrooms is still a 
possibility, under certain circumstances, but the 
standards and requirements for keeping courts open or 
allowing their closure are unclear. (Though not at 
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issue in this study, the Richmond decision also 
leaves open the question of how far beyond the 
courtroom this right of access may extend and how 
much access will fulfill the constitutional re-
quirements for an informed, self-governing people.) 
Multiple opinions, representing a divergence 
of rationale and theory, are the norm in both the 
fair trial ~ free press cases and the access cases. 
Clearly, the issues in these cases are difficultJ 
First Amendment questions always produce differences 
of opinion and ·pointed debate. Nevertheless, these 
are crucial issues in a free society and the highest 
Court in the nation has an obligation to produce 
rulings that are definitive, firm, and understandable. 
In dealing with the issue of a public right of access 
to the courtroom, it has failed to do so. 
72 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Court Decisions. 
Baker v. Utecht 68 s.ct. 204 (1947). 
Barker v. Wingo 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972). 
Branzburg v. Hayes 92 S.Ct. 2646 (1972). 
Bridges v. California 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
Chandler v. Florida 49 LW 4142 (1981). 
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn 95 S.Ct. 1029 (1975). 
Craig v. Harney 67 S.Ct. 1249 (1947). 
Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 146 (1968). 
Escobedo v. Illinois 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
Estes v. Texas 85 S.Ct. 1628 (1965). 
Faretta v. California 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975). 
Gannett v. DePasquale 99 S.Ct. 2898 (1979). 
Geise v. U.S. (1959, CA 9 Alaska) 965 F 2d 659. 
Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
Gitlow v. New York 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
Griswold v. Connecticutt 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
Houchins v. KQED 98 S.Ct. 2588 (1978). 
In re Oliver 68 s.ct. 499 (1948). 
-- . 
Irwin v. Dowd 81 S.Ct. 1639 (1961). 
Kleindienst v. Mandel 92 S.Ct. 2576 (1972). 
Levine v. U.S. 80 S.Ct. 1605 (1960). 
Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
Marshall v. U.S. 360 U.S. 310 (1959). 
73 
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show 333 U.S. 912 (1950). 
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania 91 S.Ct. 499 (1971). 
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
Murphy v. Florida 95 S.Ct. 2031 (1975). 
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson 51 s.ct. 625 (1931). 
Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart 96 S.Ct. 2791 (1976). 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 276 U.S. 354 (1964). 
New York Times Co. v. U.S. 91 S.Ct. 2140 (1971). 
Nixon v. Warner Communications 98 S.Ct. 1306 (1978). 
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe 91 S.Ct. 1575 (1971). 
Pell v. Procunier 94 S.Ct. 2800 (1974). 
Pennekamp v. Florida 66 S.Ct. ,1029 (1946). 
Perez v. Metz (1977 SD NY) 459 F Supp 1131. 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm. 
395 u.s. 367 (1969). 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 100 S.Ct. 2814 (1980). 
Rideau v. Louisiana 83 S.Ct. 1417 (1963). 
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
Singer v. u.s. 85 s.ct. 783 (1965). 
Shepherd v. Florida 343 U.S. 181 (1952). 
Sheppard v. Maxwell 86 S.Ct. 1507 (1966). 
Stanley v. Georgia 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U.S. 247 U.S. 402 (1917). 
Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas (1957, DC Pa) 
153 F Supp 486, affd (CA 3 Pa) 254 F 2d 883. 
74 
U.S. ex rel. Laws v. Yeager (1971, CA 3 NJ) 448 F2d 
714=, cert den 405 U.S. 976, 31 L Ed 2d 251, 92 
s.ct. 1201. 
U.S. ex rel. Mayberry v. Yeager (1971, DC NJ) 321 F 
Supp 199, 
U.S. ex rel. Orlando v. Fay (1965, CA 2 NY) 350 F 2d 
967, cert den 384 U.S. 1008, 16 L Ed 2d 1021, 
8 6 s . ct • 1 961. 
U.S. v. Bell (1972, CA 2 NY) 464 F2d 667, cert den 
409 u.s. 991, 34 L Ed 2d 258, 93 s.ct. 335. 
U.S. v. Carolene Products Co. J04 U.S. 144 (19JR). 
U .s. v. Cianfrani (197~·, CA 3 Pa) 573 F 2d 835. 
U.S. v. Juarez (197R, CA 5 Tex) 573 F 2d 267, reh den 
(CA 5 Tex) 577 F 2d 1134 and cert den 439 U.S. 
915, 5R L Ed 2d 262, 99 s.ct. 2s9. 
U.S. v. Kobli (1949, CA 3 Pa) 172 F 2d 919. 
U.S. v. Lopez (1971, ED NY) J28 F Supp 1077, 14 ALR 
Fed 252. 
u.s. v. Nixon 94 s.ct. Jo90. 
U.S. v. Rios Ruiz (1978, CAl Puerto Rico) 579 F 2d 
670. 
Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council 
425 u.s. 748 (1976). 
Week v. U.S. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
Zemel v. Rusk 85 S.Ct. 1271 (1965). 
Books and Articles. 
Abraham, H. Freedom and the Court. New York: Oxford 
Univ. Press. 1977. 
American Bar Association. Project on Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Fair Trial and Free Press. 
2-15 Approved Draft 1968. 
Bentham, Jeremy. The Rationale of Judicial Evidence. 
1827. 
-----------. Treatise on Judicial Evidence. 1825. 
75 
Blackstone, w. Commentaries on the Laws of England. 
*372. 
Brennan, William J, "Address," Rutgers L.R., 32: 
173-186 (1979). 
Britton, Paul, "The Right to Attend Pretrial 
Criminal Proceedings: Free Press, Public 
Trial, and Priorities in Curbing Pretrial 
Publicity." Syracuse L.R. 28(4): 875-921. 
"Closure Orders: Safeguard of Fair Trial or Prior 
Restraint?" Fordham Urban J.L. 7:163-90 
(1978-79). 
Coke, E. Institutes of the Laws of England. 103. 
6th Edition. 1681. 
Copple, Robert F. "Public Trials and a First 
Amendment Right of Access: A Presumption 
of Openness," Nebraska L.R. 60: 169-199 (1981). 
Cox, Archibald. "Freedom of Expression in the 
Burger Court," Harvard L.R. 92: 1-73 (November 
1980) • 
Dennis, Charles W., Jr. "A First and Ninth Amend-
ment Theory of a Right of Access to Criminal 
Trials," West New England L.R., 2: 723-758 
(Spring 1980). 
Ely, John Hart. Democracy and Distrust. Cambridge 
and London: Harvard Univ. Press. 1980. -
"Free Press - Fair Trial Dilemma: New Dimensions 
in a Continuing Struggle," Hofstra L.R. 6:1013-
40 (Summer 1978). 
Friendly, Alfred and Ronald L. Goldfarb, Crime and 
PMblicity. New York: The Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1967. 
Goodale, James c. "Gannett Means What It Says; But 
Who Knows,What It Says?" Natl L.J. October 
15' 1979. 
----------. "The Press Ungagged: The Practical Effect 
on Gag Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Assoc, 
v. Stuart," Stanford L.R. 29(3): 497-513 
(February 1977). 
Hale, M. The History of the Common Law of England, 
6th ed. 1820, 
76 
Hamilton, Alexander. The Federalist. #84. 
Holdsworth, w. A History of English Law. 1927. 
Howden, Jonathan. "Freedom of Expression and the 
Media, Gannet Co. v. DePasquale," Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 7: 338-352 (Winter 1980). 
Kelley, Stephen M. "Members of the Public and Press 
Have No Sixth Amendment Right to Attend Pre-
trial Criminal Proceedings," U. Detroit J 
Urban L. 57:547-87 (Spring 1980). 
Landau, J.C. "Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due 
Process Proposal," ABAJ 62: 55-64 (January 
1976). --
"Legal History& Origins of the Public Trial," 
Ind, L.J. 35: 251-255 (1960), 
Lubben, Craig H. "Right of Access to Criminal 
Trials," J. of Criminal Law & Criminology 
71: 547-557 (Winter 1980). 
Maitland, F.W. The Constitutional History of 
England. Cambridge: Un~versity Press. 1961. 
Pollack, F. The Expansion of the Common Law. i4o. 
1904. 
Portman, Sheldon. "The Defense of Fair Trial from 
Sheppard to Nebraska Press Association: Benign 
Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond," 
Stanford L.R. 29(3): 393-410 (February 1977), 
Radin. "The Right to a Public Trial," Temple L.Q. 
6: 381-388 (1932). 
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. 
Censorship Newsletter. Washington: VIII 
(October - November 1975). 
"The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings," Columbia L.R. 
78: 1308-1321 (1'978). 
Sack, Robert D. "Principle and Nebraska Press 
Association v. Stuart," Stanford L.R. 29(3): 
411-430 (February 1977). 
Shapiro, M. and D. Hobbs. The Politics of Constitu-
tional Law with revisions. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Winthrop Publishers, Inc. 1974. 
77 
'l 
Stephenson, Carl·and Frederick G. Marcham, ed. 
Sources of English Constitutional History. 
New York and London1 Harper and Brothers. 
1937. 
Stephenson, D.G., Jr. "Fair Trial - Free Press1 
Rights in Continuing Conflict," Brooklyn L.R. 
46: 39-66 (Fall 1979). 
Story, J. Commentaries on the Constitution of 
the U.S. 662. 1833. 
"The Supreme Court, 1979 term: Freedom of Speech, 
Press, and Association," Harvard L.R. 941 149-
159 (November 1980). 
Winter, Bill. "Richmond Case Widens Access, Spawns 
Doubts," ABAJ 661 946-947 (August 1980). 
Woodward, Bob and Scott Armstrong. The Brethren. 
New Yorks Simon and Schuster. 1979. 
Zavatsky, M.J. "Rights in Collisions Deciding 
Cases in the Free Press/Fair Trial Debate," 
U. Cinn. L.R. 491 440-61 (1980). 
78 
VITA 
Born on April 13, 1941, in South Boston, 
Virginia, I am the only child of Ruth D. Dixon 
and the late Royster B. Dixon. I attended pub-
lic schools in South Boston, graduating from 
Halifax County High School in 1959. 
I studied at Westhampton College from 
September of 1959 to January of 1962 when I 
transferred to the College of William and Mary, 
graduating with an AB in history and government 
in 1963. Shortly thereafter, I married E.J. 
Bowen of Halifax, Virginia. 
While my husband studied dentistry at the 
Medical College of Virginia, I taught history 
and government at John Randolph Tucker High 
School. Upon his graduation, we moved to 
Savannah, Georgia, where he began a tour of duty 
with the U.S. Army Dental Corps. While my hus-
band served a tour in Vietnam, I returned to 
South Boston where I taught and served as guid-
ance counselor at Mary Bethune High School. 
We returned to Richmond in 1969 where my 
husband established a private dental practice. 
We have three children -- Sydney McKenna, born 
in 1970; Charles Neville, born in 1973; and Anne 
Lindsay, born in 1974. Our family presently re-
sides at 28 Maxwell Road, Richmond. 
Since returning to Richmond, I have been 
active in civic and community affairs, serving 
on various charitable, religious, and community-
action boards, committees, clubs, and guilds. 
I am presently a member of the Board of Directors 
of the Richmond Urban League. 
My most intense involvement has been in the 
political sphere where I have worked in the Demo-
cratic Party for various campaigns. I have also 
been President of the Richmond Area Democratic 
Woman's Club, Vice President of the Virginia 
Federation of Democratic Women's Clubs, member 
of the State Central Committee of the Democratic 
Party of Virginia, member of the Third District 
Democratic Committee, and delegate to the 1980 
Democratic National Convention. I am presently 
the chairman of the Democratic Party in the city 
of Richmond and Third District coordinator for the 
Baliles for Attorney qeneral campaign. 
My family is active in River Road Church where 
I have been Superintendent of the Church School and 
member of the Board of Administration. In addi-
tion, I served for two years (1978-79) as ad 
interim Director of Education and administrative 
assistant to the pastor. 
